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LUKASHENKA MAKES ATTEMPTS TO COME TO AN 
AGREEMENT WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION  
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Resume 
 
Lukashenka had a meeting with Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU 
Commissioner responsible for External Relations and European 
Neighbourhood Policy in Minsk on June 21, 2009.   
The Minister of Finance of Belarus A. Kharkaviets informed the 
public on June 24, 2009 that Belarus had appealed to the 
European Union for financial assistance.  
These events are linked with certain logic. De facto, Lukashenka 
was negotiating conditions of providing financial support to 
Belarus during the meeting with the EU Commissioner. At the 
same time, these events show that a period of more intense 
cooperation may be started in relations between Belarus and the 
European Union.  
 
 
Just like during a meeting with Javier Solana in February 2009, Lukashenka has offered 
another geopolitical contract to the European Union this time. He proposes to develop 
cooperation on the following basis: Belarus is an independent state (from Russia) and the 
Belarusian government rejects to make concessions to Russia.  
However, presently, the development of relations between Belarus and the European 
Union will rather be determined by the EU than by Lukashenka’s regime. It is absolutely 
excluded that Lukashenka’s regime will come back to its policy line of balancing between 
Russia and the West. The threat on the part of Russia is getting more and more evident.  
If the EU continues to demand Lukashenka to take a number of further steps towards 
political liberalization, despite his hopes, it is quite possible that the regime will dare 
make these concessions. Firstly, they will be related to the release of political prisoners 
and improvement of working conditions of non-governmental organizations in the 
country.  
It is hardly possible that the Belarusian official side will make any other political 
concessions. Both the European Union and Belarus value high cooperation in other fields, 
including the Eastern Partnership program, power engineering etc. 
If the official authorities provide more opportunities for the activities of the political part 
of opposition (politicians, political parties and movements), the voters will get it even 
more clearly that the opposition in its present state does not make an alternative to 
Lukashenka’s regime. They will see that the opposition is more harmful in its present 
poor state than the incumbent regime, among other taking into account the attempts of 
Russia to reinforce its positions in Belarus. 
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Lukashenka's Dead-line Is December 2013 
 
The first visit of the European Commissioner to Belarus, during which her meeting with 
Lukashenka was planned, was scheduled for March 12 and 13. On March 11 Lukashenka 
defiantly went on a working visit to Armenia. By doing so, the authorities indicated to the 
European Union that they had no intention to discuss the subject of human rights and 
political liberalization in Belarus. Lukashenka did not see it fit to repeat to Ferrero-
Waldner what he had said to Javier Solana in February.  
By all appearances, the authorities counted on Russia's assistance during the economic 
crisis. In spring 2009 Lukashenka, Prime Minister Sidorski and other officials repeatedly 
stated that they counted on Russia issuing credits. They voiced confidence that Russia 
would issue a multibillion credit on preferential terms to build a nuclear power plant in 
Belarus (because it will be built by Russian company "Rosatom"). In similar statements 
at the end of May there was more and more irritation. Russian government's measures to 
restrict Belarusian exports become more and more evident. And there were less and less 
hopes on credits from Russia. 
At the height of "trade war" with Russia, on May 28 Lukashenka and Sidorski met Putin in 
Miensk. It became clear that authorities' hopes that Russia would act as an ally and help 
Belarus were vain. Russia started to act as a predator. It made public its appetites 
towards a growingly weaker (according to Russia's Finance Minister Kudrin's statements) 
Belarus. 
The credit of USD five hundred million was denied. Russia did not believe that the credit 
for building the nuclear power plant would be used for the purpose specified. A refusal 
ensued on this issue as well. 
On June 10 Russian company "Transneft" started building BPS-2 (Baltic Pipeline System). 
By December 2013 when the second stage of BPS-2 will be put into operation, Russia will 
get important levers of pressure on Lukashenka's regime. It is probable that these levers 
were missing to "put the squeeze on" Lukashenka in May 2009. 
 
Firstly. Russia will get possibilities to transport its oil by-passing Belarus. 
Secondly. The modernization of the large oil refinery in the town of Kirishi will allow to 
refine those volumes of oil that were previously sent to Belarusian oil refineries ("Naftan" 
in Navapolacak and Mazyr Oil Refinery). Belarus will lose an important source of currency 
proceeds. Even in 2008, the unfavourable year for Belarusian oil refinery because of the 
drop in oil prices in the world market, two above-mentioned oil refineries were on the 
second and third positions on the list of major donors of the Belarusian budget. 
Building of BPS-2 was for a long time a threat of the Russian authorities. This threat 
became a reality when relations between Belarus and Russia were already white-hot. 
Russia's intentions towards integration with Belarus became transparent to the 
Belarusian authorities. 
On June 12 Lukashenka called Ferrero-Waldner and asked her to visit Belarus "as soon as 
possible"… 
 
 
Position of Lukashenka’s Regime in Relations with the EU: New Aspects  
 
The construction of the Baltic Pipeline System-2 deprives the regime of any hope to 
improve relations with Russia, to avoid the Russian pressure and demands to become its 
puppet state.  
A considerable gap will appear in relations between Lukashenka’s regime and Russia. 
This “breach in the wall” has to be plastered. Otherwise, Russia will burst into the 
country. The breach can be fixed with the assistance of the European Union and the West 
only.  
The issue of cooperation with the European Union in the fields of power engineering, 
technologies and diversification of export becomes a matter of life and death for the 
Belarusian official authorities. 
At the first glance, it seems that Lukashenka’s regime hasn’t changed its position. Once 
again, Lukashenka has proposed the EU to develop cooperation with Belarus, as firstly, 
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Belarus is an independent (of Russia) state and secondly, as Belarus declared taking 
concrete steps on development of cooperation with the European Union. Thus, 
Lukashenka stated on June 21, 2009 as follows: “Although some people (in Russia) 
dislike it, we are eager to build good relations with you (i.e., the EU).” 
It is highly significant that the EU Commissioner visited Belarus on Lukashenka’s personal 
invitation. At the same time, a number of important emphases in Lukashenka’s appeal to 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner show considerable changes in the dialogue between the regime 
and the European Union. 
 
1. Lukashenka was doing his best to show that he didn’t play a game and that he wasn’t 
blackmailing the West. The possibility of terminating the dialogue with the European 
Union is excluded.  
During a meeting with J. Solana in February 2009, Lukashenka was talking about a range 
of pre-conditions for starting a dialogue with the European Union. Presently, the official 
authorities make it clear that they are ready to discuss the issues of political liberalization 
in Belarus as well. 
 
2. The governmental authorities have shown the EU that facing threats on the part of 
Russia, they are more interested in development of cooperation with the European Union 
than the EU is interested in development of cooperation with Belarus.  
In the light of Russia’s intrusion to Georgia, the Belarusian government used to 
emphasize that the West was more interested in the dialogue. However, presently the 
Belarusian official authorities are proceeding from an assumption that Russia constitutes 
a larger menace to the incumbent Lukashenka’s regime than to the West. 
 
